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Criminal Procedure: Another Loophole in Miranda:
The "Undercover Agent" Exception in Illinois v.
Perkins
I. Introduction
In Illinois v. Perkins,' an undercover law enforcement officer posing as
an inmate employed a "jailbreak" ruse to elicit incriminating statements
from the incarcerated Perkins. During the ruse, Perkins implicated himself
in a murder. The United States Supreme Court held that an undercover law
enforcement officer is not required to give Miranda warnings to an incar-
cerated suspect before asking questions that may elicit incriminating state-
ments.3 According to the Court, interests protected by Miranda are not
implicated by the use of undercover agents employed in the prison context.
4
Therefore, Miranda warnings are not required to safeguard the constitutional
rights of inmates who make voluntary statements to undercover agents. 5
This note begins by summarizing the background and facts of Perkins.
Next, the majority opinion, Justice Brennan's concurrence and Justice Mar-
shall's dissent are summarized. This note demonstrates that Perkins is not
consistent with previous decisions involving jailhouse informants. In fact,
this note concludes that Perkins creates an exception to Miranda that places
little restriction on conduct which is designed to deliberately elicit statements
from incarcerated suspects.
II. Law Prior to Illinois v. Perkins
The fifth amendment guarantees citizens the privilege against self-incrim-
ination.6 The Supreme Court secured this privilege in a landmark decision
in Miranda v. Arizona.7 Miranda established strict guidelines requiring that
all subjects of custodial questioning' must be advised of their rights prior
1. 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see infra notes 6-9 and accompanying text
(discussion of Miranda and the Court's holding in that case).
3. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2396.
4. Id. at 2399.
5. Id.
6. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V. The relevant part of the fifth amendment reads that no person
"shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id.
7. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, police officers, detectives, and the prosecuting attorney
questioned the defendant in a room cut off from the outside world. "[I]t is obvious that such
an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual
to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation. To be sure,
this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity." Miranda, 384
U.S. at 457.
8. Custodial interrogation means, according to Miranda, "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
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to any interrogation by police.9 These guidelines are commonly referred to
as Miranda rights.
In a subsequent decision, Rhode Island v. Innis,10 the Court widened the
scope of interrogation subject to Miranda requirements. In Innis, interro-
gation included not only express questioning by police but also any words
or actions (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect." Further, in Moran v. Burbine,2 the Supreme Court
identified the objective of Miranda as not to "mold police conduct for its
own sake" but to dissipate the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation
to prevent abridgment of fifth amendment rights. 3
Prior to Perkins, the Supreme Court had not resolved the question of
whether Miranda requirements would apply when undercover agents question
incarcerated suspects.' 4 Lower courts were split over the issue."
The Court previously had addressed the use of undercover agents or
informants eliciting statements from incarcerated suspects in violation of
9. Id. at 467. Miranda requires that all subjects of custodial interrogation must be advised
prior to questioning that: (1) they have the right to remain silent; (2) anything they say can
be used against them in a court of law; (3) they have the right to have an attorney present;
and (4) if they cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for them prior to questioning
if they so desire. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
10. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
11. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. In Innis, a man arrested for murder asserted his right to counsel
but then revealed the Iccation of the weapon in response to conversation between two officers
transporting him to the police station who speculated on the consequences should children
find the hidden murder weapon before police. Id. at 294-95. The Court held that the conver-
sation between the two officers did not constitute "interrogation" of the suspect. Id. at 300-
02.
12. 475 U.S. 412 (1986). In Moran, the Court held that police failure to inform defendant
of his attorney's phone call did not deprive defendant of information essential to knowingly
waive his fifth amendment right to remain silent. Id. at 421-22.
13. Id. at 425.
14. The Court in United States v. Henry left open its position in Hoffa v. United States
that the fifth amendment is not "implicated by the use of undercover Government agents
before charges are filed because of the absence of the potential for compulsion." United States
v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 272 (1980) (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966)).
15. Cases that prohibit all undercover activities which authorities should know are reason-
ably likely to elicit incriminating responses from an inmate: People v. Perkins, 176 I11. App.
3d 443, 531 N.E.2d 141 (App. Ct. 1988); Holyfield v. State, 101 Nev. 793, 711 P.2d 834
(1985); State v. Fuller, 204 Neb. 196, 281 N.W.2d 749 (1979); State v. Travis, 116 R.I. 678,
360 A.2d 548 (1976); State v. Calhoun, 479 So. 2d 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); State v.
Perkins, 753 S.W.2d 567 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); United States v. Brown, 466 F.2d 493 (10th
Cir. 1972). Contra People v. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d 1127, 751 P.2d 901, cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 514 (1988) (Miranda inapplicable to conversations between inmates and undercover agents);
State v. McDonald, 387 So. 2d 1116 (La.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 957 (1980) (same where
encounter not "intimidating"); People v. Aalbu, 696 P.2d 796 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (same);
United States v. WilloLghby, 860 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 846 (1989)
(same).
See also Note, Confusing the Fifth Amendment with the Sixth: Lower Court Misapplication
of the Innis Definition of.Interrogation, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 1073 (1989) (questioning of inmate




the sixth amendment right to counsel.16 In 1980, the Court in United States
v. Henry,17 held that the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel is
violated when a fellow inmate (a government informant) intentionally creates
a situation likely to induce the indicted defendant to make incriminating
statements without assistance of counsel.' 8
Six years later, in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 9 the Court reiterated its concern
with interrogation and/or investigative techniques equivalent to interroga-
tion.20 Kuhlmann held that the sixth amendment right to counsel is not
violated by a defendant's incriminating statements to a jailhouse informant
placed in close proximity when the informant makes no effort to stimulate
conversations about the crime charged. 2' Thus, Perkins presented the Court
with the opportunity to apply the Miranda doctrine in the prison context
when the sixth amendment right to counsel protections are inapplicable.
I. Facts of Illinois v. Perkins
In 1984, Richard Stephenson was shot and killed in a suburb of East St.
Louis, Illinois. In 1986, police learned that Donald Charlton, an inmate
serving a prison sentence for burglary at the Graham Correctional Facility
in Illinois, had information concerning the homicide. 2 Charlton told police
that while at Graham he met Perkins, a fellow inmate. According to
Charlton, Perkins confessed to him in detail about a homicide he had
committed two years earlier in an East St. Louis suburb. Because Charlton
reported details of the murder not released to the public, police found
Charlton's story credible.
By the time police heard Charlton's account, Perkins had been released
from Graham. Later that month, police learned that Perkins was incarcer-
ated in a jail in Montgomery County, Illinois, facing aggravated battery
charges unrelated to the Stephenson murder. Police decided to elicit infor-
mation about the Stephenson murder from Perkins through an undercover
police agent placed in the cellblock with Perkins. 23 As part of the ruse,
16. The sixth amendment states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic]." U.S. CoNsT. amend.
VI. After formal charges are filed against the subject of interrogation, the sixth amendment
prohibits government interference with right to counsel of accused. Maine v. Moulton, 474
U.S. 159, 176 (1985); see also Massiah v. United States 377 U.S. 201 (1964); United States v.
Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
17. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
18. Id. at 274.
19. 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
20. Id. at 457.
21. Id. at 456.
22. Charlton agreed to cooperate with police without a "deal" in exchange for his infor-
mation. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 3, Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990) (No.
88-1972). Charlton said he relayed the information to police because he believed that "[pleople
should not kill people." People v. Perkins, 176 Il. App. 3d 443, 531 N.E.2d 141, 142 (App.
Ct. 1988).
23. Police feared that the use of an eavesdropping device in the jail would be unsafe and
impracticable. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 3-4, Perkins (No. 88-1972).
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Charlton and police officer John Parisi posed as escapees from Graham's
work release program.2 Police instructed Parisi and Charlton not to question
Perkins about the murder, but merely to engage him in conversation and
relay any information obtained.Y
Police placed Parisi and Charlton, wearing jail garb, in the cellblock with
Perkins at the Montgomery County jail. Charlton introduced Parisi to
Perkins as "Vito." Parisi told Perkins about his and Charlton's escape
from Graham. Parisi also said that he wasn't going to do any more time
and he "needed to get out of there."' ' Perkins replied that he could have
a gun smuggled in to take the elderly jailor hostage and showed Parisi a
crowbar hidden for use in the jail break.
Later that evening, while other inmates slept, the trio met again to refine
their plan. Perkins began by saying that his girlfriend could smuggle in a
pistol. Parisi asked Perkins if he had ever "done" anybody. Perkins then
recounted details of his involvement in the Stephenson murder in response
to questions from Parisi and Charlton. 27 Parisi and Perkins then engaged
in casual conversation before Perkins fell asleep.
24. Police developed the story that Charlton and Parisi had escaped from Graham, traveled
to the area to meet Perkins, run out of money, committed burglaries, been arrested, and
thrown in jail. Id.
25. Parisi had skimmed Chariton's interview with police, but was unfamiliar with the details
of the Stephenson murder. Id.
26. Id. at 5.
27. Parisi summarized the rest of the conversation with Perkins:
[Parisi:] You ever do anyone?
[Perkins:] Yeah, once in East St. Louis, in a rich white neighborhood ... by a
race track in Feirview Heights
Me and two guys cased the house for about a week ... the second house on
the left from the corner.
[Parisi:] How long ago did this happen?
Perkins: Appro.,dmately about two years ago. I got paid $5,000 for that job.
[Parisi:] How did it go down?
Perkins: I walked up to this guy['s] house with a sawed-off under my trench
coat.
[Parisi:] What type gun[?]
Perkins: A .12 gauge Remington Automatic Model 1100 sawed-off .... I rang
the bell and ... he motioned for me to go to the garage ....
[Parisi:] How old was the dude?
Perkins: About 40. So the garage door starts to open and I ask the dude [his
name] ....
Charlton: What kind of door was it?
Perkins: An automatic garage door. I know because I heard the motor ....
Charlton: Where did you shoot him?
Perkins: In the right leg .... [He bled to death]
[Parisi:] What ,ize shells did you use?
Perkins: I don't know what size .... So I ejected the shell and was going to
shoot him again, but [the] dogs were barking in the garage and the shot made
a lot of noise, so I just started running.
An old lady from across the street came out but I don't think she could recognize
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss3/7
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The next morning, police removed Parisi and Charlton from the cellblock.
Later, police brought Perkins to the courthouse and arrested him for
Stephenson's murder. At that time, Perkins received Miranda warnings and
requested counsel. Before trial, the court granted Perkins' motion to sup-
press his statements on the ground that government agents questioned
Perkins while in custody and without Miranda warnings.28 The state appealed
to the Appellate Court of Illinois on the sole issue of whether Perkins' fifth
amendment rights were violated.29 The Appellate Court of Illinois held that
the failure to warn Perkins pursuant to Miranda rendered his statements to
undercover agent Parisi and informant Charlton inadmissible. 0
IV. Summary of the Opinions in Illinois v. Perkins
A. The Majority Opinion
In Perkins, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded,
holding that an undercover law enforcement officer posing as a fellow
inmate need not give Miranda warnings to an incarcerated suspect before
asking questions that may elicit incriminating responses.3 Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, 2 explained that warnings are not required to
safeguard constitutional rights of inmates who make statements to under-
cover agents. Interests protected by Miranda are not implicated in these
cases.33
Initially, the majority noted that procedural safeguards of Miranda warn-
ings serve to preserve the fifth amendment privilege during incommunicado
interrogation of suspects in a police-dominated atmosphere. This atmosphere
produces inherently compelling pressures on suspects to confess involuntar-
me because it was 8:30 at night and it was getting dark.
[Parisi:] Who had the guy done?
Perkins: One of the guys in the car. He worked with him somehow.
He owed him money for drugs ....
Charlton: What did you do with the gun?
Perkins: I threw it over a four or five hundred foot cliff as you are going into
Litchfield.
Id. at 5-8.
28. Id. at 10.
29. Id.
30. People v. Perkins, 176 Ill. App. 3d 443, 531 N.E.2d 141, 146 (App. Ct. 1988).
31. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2399.
32. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and Scalia
joined Justice Kennedy.
33. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2399. The Court noted that the use of undercover agents is a
recognized law enforcement technique, often employed in the prison context to detect violence
against correctional officers or inmates. See also Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police
Rulemaking, 53 Tax. L. Ray. 203 (1975) (discussing problems in developing workable guidelines
for use by undercover agents in investigations).
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ily.34 The requirements of Miranda, however, would be enforced only in
those situations that implicate the concerns underlying Miranda."
According to the majority, questioning by captors who appear to control
the suspect's fate may create pressures that will "weaken the suspect's
will." 36 The conversation between Perkins and the two police agents, how-
ever, lacked the essential factors important in Miranda: a police-dominated
atmosphere and compulsion. 37 Because Perkins spoke freely to those whom
he considered fellow inmates, the coercive atmosphere was lacking."
Miranda's premise is that the danger of coercion results from interaction
between custody and official interrogation. When the police agent wears the
same prison gray uniform as the suspect, however, there is no "interplay"
between police interrogation and police custody.39 Hence, Miranda warnings
are not required when a suspect is in custody in a technical sense and
converses unknowingly with a government agent. 4°
The majority asserted that detention does not warrant a presumption that
undercover questioning would render resulting statements involuntary and,
thus, inadmissible. 4 Statements given freely and voluntarily without any
compelling influences are still admissible in evidence.4 2 Although coercion
is forbidden, strategic deceptions43 that mislead a suspect or lull him into a
false sense of security are not the compulsion or coercion concerns under-
lying Miranda.41 Thus, Miranda does not protect suspects who boast about
their criminal activities in front of persons whom they believe to be their
cellmates. 45 Next, the majority addressed Hoffa v. United States 6 and Mathis
v. United States.47 In Hoffa, the Court held permissible under the fifth
amendment the placement of an undercover agent near a suspect in order
to gather incriminating information. 48 The fact that the undercover agent
34. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2397 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 437 (1966)).
35. Id. (citing Berlkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984)).
36. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2397.
37. Id.
38. Trickery of the "jail plant" ploy affords the suspect no opportunity to apply his
powers of resistance bi.cause the peril of speaking is hidden from him. White, Police Trickery
in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 581, 606 (1979).
39. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2397 (quoting Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and
Miranda: What is "Interrogation"? When Does it Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1, 67, 63 (1978)).
"[Tihere is no 'interplay between police interrogation and police custody,"' at least where it
counts - in the suspect's mind. As far as the suspect is aware, the suspect is not "surrounded
by antagonistic forces." Id. at 64 (eniphasis in original).
40. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2397.
41. Id. at 2398.
42. Id. at 2397 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
43. Use of trickery or deceit in the questioning of criminal suspects is a staple of current
police interrogation practices. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L.
REv. 581 (1979).
44. Perkins, 110 S& Ct. at 2397.
45. Id. at 2398. Coercion is determined from the perspective of the suspect. Rhode Island
v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984).
46. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
47. 391 U.S. 1 (1958).




fooled the suspect into thinking he was a sympathetic colleague did not
affect the voluntariness of the statements. 49 The only difference between
Perkins and Hoffa, noted the majority, was the incarceration of Perkins.5
In Mathis, the Court held inadmissible under the fifth amendment an
inmate's incriminating statements disclosed during questioning by an Internal
Revenue Service agent about possible tax fraud charges."' The majority held
Mathis inapposite because there is no presumption of coercion when the
inmate is unaware that he is speaking to a government agent.
52
The majority in Perkins also noted that the sixth amendment precedents
were inapplicable because charges had not been filed on the murder which
was the subject of the interrogation.53 Finally, the majority observed that
police will have little difficulty applying the Perkins holding that undercover
agents need not give Miranda warnings to incarcerated suspects.5 4 Finding
no federal obstacle to the admissibility of Perkins' statements at trial, the
Court reversed and remanded. 5
B. The Concurring Opinion
Justice Brennan 6 concurred with the majority that Miranda is inapplicable
when a suspect is unaware that his questioner is a police agent.5 7 Brennan
emphasized, however, that the issue on appeal focused on the applicability
of Miranda to questioning of incarcerated suspects by undercover agents.58
Therefore, if Perkins had invoked his fifth amendment right to silence and/
or his sixth amendment right to counsel, the proper inquiry would focus
on whether he subsequently waived his asserted rights.
59
49. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2398 (referring to Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 304) (during Hoffa's trial,
an undercover agent reported Hoffa had divulged his attempts to bribe jury members).
50. Id.
51. Mathis, 391 U.S. at 4-5.
52. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2398.
53. Id. at 2399; see supra notes 16-21 for discussion of the sixth amendment cases.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. At the time this note was written, Judge David Souter had replaced Justice Brennan
on the Court.
57. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2399 (Brennan, J., concurring).
58. Id. The record does not indicate whether Perkins previously invoked either his sixth
amendment right to counsel or fifth amendment right to silence on the aggravated battery
charge. Also, the record does not indicate whether police had formally or informally charged
Perkins with either aggravated battery or Stephenson's murder. The sixth amendment prohibits
police interference with right to counsel after charges are filed on the subject of the interro-
gation. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 458 n.21 (1986) (same); Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412, 431 (1986) (same); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 n.16 (1985) (statements
obtained in violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel must be excluded only from
trial of offense as to which right has attached). However, if police had formally charged
Perkins with aggravated battery and he had invoked his right to counsel or Miranda rights,
he might challenge admissibility of his incriminating statements. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486
U.S. 675 (1988) (invocation of fifth amendment right to counsel by one in custody prohibits
police from initiating "custodial interrogation" concerning even separate crimes).
59. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2399 (Brennan, J., concurring). Waiver of Miranda rights "must
1991]
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Justice Brennan stated that the Constitution does not condone the method
used to elicit the confession in Perkins.6 Brennan emphasized that certain
interrogation teiniques, such as the deception and manipulation practiced
on Perkins, are "offensive to a civilized system of justice" and thus
condemned under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 6'
Nevertheless, Brennan concurred, but only on the sole issue of the appli-
cability of Miranda.
While custody itself imposes pressures on the accused, Justice Brennan
noted, confinement may produce subtle influences, making the accused
particularly susceptible to the "ploys of undercover government agents."
'62
Further, Brennan suggested that the state is in a unique position to exploit
a suspect's vulnerability because it has complete control over the suspect's
environment. 63 Therefore, the state can ensure that the suspect is barraged
with questions from an undercover agent until the suspect confesses. 61
Finally, Justice Brennan concluded that the lower court on remand should
determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, police elicited
Perkins' confession in a manner that violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 65 Brennan added that although the confession was
not elicited by means of physical torture 6 or overt psychological pressure, 67
a court's duty to enforce federal constitutional protections does not cease,
but only becomes more difficult, because of the more delicate judgments
to be made.
68
C. The Dissenting Opinion
In dissent, Justice Marshall argued that Perkins was in custody as that
term is defined in Miranda because police questioned Perkins in jail. 69
Marshall rejected the argument that Perkins was not in custody for purposes
of Miranda because of his familiarity with the custodial environment as a
result of spendig two days in jail.70
[be] voluntary in the sense that it [must be] the product of a free and deliberate choice rather
than intimidation, coercion, or deception." Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421.
60. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2399 (Brennan, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 2399-400 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109-
10 (1985), cert. denied, Miller v. Neubert, 479 U.S. 989 (1986)).
62. Id. at 2400 (quoting United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980)).
63. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2400-01 (Brennan, J., concurring).
66. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
67. See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
68. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2401 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315, 321 (1959), overruled, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
69. Id. at 2401 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70. Id. Cf. Oroxco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (suspect who had been arrested in his





Although the majority downplayed the nature of the interrogation by
"disingenuously" referring to the questioning as conversation, 7' Marshall
insisted that the conversation became an interrogation because police sub-
jected Perkins to express questioning intended to evoke an incriminating
response.72 Therefore, in Marshall's view, police should have informed
Perkins of his Miranda rights.73
According to Marshall, the concerns underlying Miranda include not only
police coercion.74 Such concerns also include any police tactics that might
compel a suspect in custody to make incriminating statements without full
awareness of his constitutional rights .7 Therefore, the compulsion proscribed
by Miranda includes deception by the police. 76 Marshall distinguished the
deceptive interrogation tactics in Hoffa v. United States 7 by noting that
Hoffa was not in custody, as was Perkins.
78
Next, Marshall emphasized the state's advantage in obtaining incriminat-
ing statements from incarcerated suspects because psychological pressures
inherent in confinement increase a suspect's anxiety and make him likely to
seek relief by confiding in others.79 Police control over the people with
whom the suspect may confide presents unique opportunities to exploit the
suspect's vulnerability. Thus, if pressures of confinement make the suspect
confide in anyone, police can make sure it will be their agent.8 0
Moreover, Marshall stated that an incarcerated suspect is under the
constant threat of physical danger peculiar to the prison environment.8' An
inmate may have to demonstrate his toughness to other inmates by recount-
ing or inventing past violent acts.8 2 Marshall charged that police deceptively
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2402; see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 (referring to "inherent pressures of the interrogation
atmosphere"); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 467 (1981) ("The purpose of [Miranda] ad-
monitions is to combat what the Court saw as 'inherently compelling pressures' at work on
the person and to provide him with an awareness of the Fifth Amendment privilege and the
consequences of forgoing it") (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
76. Id. Justice Marshall referred to the following: Miranda, 384 U.S. at 453 (indicting
police tactics "to induce a confession out of trickery," such as using fictitious witnesses or
false accusations); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 (1984) ("The purposes of the
safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive
suspects into confessing") (emphasis deleted, emphasis added); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 421 (1986) ("IT]he relinquishment of the right [protected by the Miranda warnings] must
have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather
than intimidation, coercion, or deception.") (emphasis added).
'77. 385 U.S. 293 (1966), reh'g denied, 386 U.S. 940, 951 (1967).
78. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2402.
79. Id. at 2403. Justice Marshall referenced his statements to Dix, Undercover Investigations
and Police Rulemaking, 53 TFx. L. REv. 203, 230 (1975).
80. Id. (quoting White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 581,
605 (1979)).
81. Id.
82. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2403.
1991]
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took advantage of Perkins' psychological vulnerability by suggesting a sham
jailbreak. 3 In such a situation, Perkins could have felt compelled to dem-
onstrate his willingness to shoot a guard by recounting his past involvement
in a murder.84
According to Marshall, Miranda warnings are required because these
custodial pressures allow deceptive interrogation tactics that compel suspects
to make incriminating statements.85 This compulsion is not eliminated simply
because the suspect is unaware that his interrogator is a police agent .
6
Justice Marshall reminded the majority that their opinion was incompat-
ible with the Court's consistently held principle that Miranda should remain
"clear and simple."' 7 Such a bright line rule,"8 that Miranda warnings
precede any custodial interrogation, serves to inform with specificity what
law enforcement officers may do in conducting interrogations. 9 Finally,
Marshall warned of the disturbing ramifications of Perkins and its under-
cover agent exception to Miranda.9
V. Analysis
Rights declared in words might be lost in reality.
- Justice McKenna9'
Perkins92 establishes that an undercover officer posing as a fellow inmate
need not give Miranda warnings to an incarcerated suspect before asking
questions that may elicit an incriminating response. 9 By determining that
conversations between an incarcerated suspect and an undercover police
agent do not implicate the concerns underlying Miranda,9 the Court has
created another exception to custodial interrogation. 95
83. Id.
84. Id. Agent Parisi stressed that a killing may be necessary in the escape and then asked
Perkins if he had ever murdered someone.
85. Id.
86. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87. Id. Justice Marshall referred to the following: Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42 (noting
that one reason certiorari was granted was "to give concrete guidelines for law enforcement
agencies and courts to follow"); McCarty, 468 U.S. at 430 (noting that one of "the principal
advantages of the [Miranda] doctrine ... is the clarity of that rule"); Roberson, 486 U.S. at
680 (same); see also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657-58 (1984) (recognizing need for
clarity in Miranda doctrine but finding narrow "public safety" exception does not significantly
lessen clarity and is easy for police to apply).
88. Justice Marshvil is referring to Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, reh'g denied, 444 U.S.
887 (1979).
89. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2403-04. Justice Marshall is quoting from Fare, 442 U.S. at 718.
90. Id.
91. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
92. 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990).
93. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2399.
94. Id. at 2397.




This exception seems clear: undercover agents need not give Miranda
warnings to incarcerated suspects. As Marshall noted in Perkins, however,
the outer boundaries of this exception are by no means clear.96 Perkins
would not permit such obvious compulsion as an undercover agent threat-
ening an inmate into confessing.97 Nevertheless, left unresolved in Perkins
is how far police undercover agents or jailhouse informants may go in their
attempts to deliberately elicit incriminating statements from incarcerated
suspects. 98
The Court, in Moran v. Burbine,9 noted that custodial interrogations are
composed of two competing concerns: (1) the need for police questioning
as a tool for effective law enforcement; and (2) the risk that police will
inadvertently cross the line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions
and impermissible compulsion2Y° Miranda tried to reconcile these opposing
concerns, according to Moran, by giving the suspect some control over the
interrogation.10'
Perkins, however, could not exert control over the interrogation. Perkins
remained unaware of any interrogation because he viewed agent Parisi as a
fellow cellmate. The fact that police exerted control over the course of the
interrogation, nevertheless, is apparent by the specific questions asked by
Parisi and Charlton in an attempt to manipulatively invoke incriminating
responses from Perkins.'02
Moreover, the Court in Perkins concluded that Miranda offered no
protection for suspects boasting about their criminal activities to cellmates.103
suspect which are not "police-dominated" in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984).
The Court held that roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to routine traffic
stop did not constitute "custodial interrogation." Id. at 441. The Court noted that a routine
traffic stop exposed to public view "both reduces the ability of an unscrupulous policeman to
use illegitimate means to elicit self-incriminating statements and diminishes the motorist's fear
that, if he does not cooperate, he will be subjected to abuse." Id. at 438.
96. Id. at 2404.
97. The Supreme Court has prohibited invidious police conduct in obtaining involuntary
confessions. See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (defendant confessed after police
implied that a mob was after him and that he would be protected if he told the truth);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (defendant subjected to repeated questioning over
seven days while being held incommunicado); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)
(defendant twice hung to a tree and then whipped).
98. Both Justice Brennan's concurrence and Justice Marshall's dissent took issue with the
majority's approval of the deception and manipulation used to elicit the confession from
Perkins. Police agencies also recognize that deception as a tool in law enforcement is often
viewed with distaste by community members. Dix, supra, note 33, at 208.
99. 475 U.S. 412 (1986). For a discussion of Moran, see supra note 11 and accompanying
text.
100. Id. at 426.
101. Id.
102. For the text of the conversation between Perkins and Parisi and Charlton, see supra
note 27.
103. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2398.
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However, Perkins made statements about his prior criminal activities only
after police devised a ruse - the jailbreak - to lure him into incriminating
himself. Such action by Parisi and Charlton beyond merely listening should
have traversed that fine line between legitimate and impermissible compul-
sion.
The Court's previous decisions involving jailhouse informants violating
the sixth amendment right to counsel suggest that Parisi and Charlton's
action became irapermissible compulsion.'04 The Court in United States v.
Henry'0s held that although the jailhouse informant did not directly question
defendant, the informant "stimulated" conversation with defendant in order
to elicit incriminating information in violation of the right to counsel.1 6
In Kuhlmanne 7 the Court found no violation of the sixth amendment
right to counsel where a jailhouse informant acted as a "listening post"
without "participating in active conversation and prompting particular re-
plies." °s Clearly, in Perkins, Parisi did not act as a mere listening post but
subjected Perkins to deliberate questioning in order to "stimulate" an
incriminating conversation.' 9
This "listening post" rationale is also inferred beyond the sixth amend-
ment cases. In Hoffa, police requested the government informant to only
report information of illegal activity of which he became aware." 0 There
are no indications in Hoffa that the informant made any attempt to delib-
erately elicit incriminating information from the suspect. "' In fact, Chief
Justice Warren noted that the informant became the equivalent of a "bug-
ging device" that reported everything seen or heard." 2
The better reasoned rule from Perkins would remain consistent with the
sixth amendment cases by allowing admission of incriminating statements
if the undercover agent served only as a listening post and made no deliberate
attempt to elicit statements.113 Such a rule would offer some measure of
104. This note is aware that "the policies underlying the two constitutional protections [fifth
and sixth amendments] are quite distinct." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300. n.4.
However, the rationlde of prohibiting the use of undercover agents in deliberately eliciting
incriminating, statements from incarcerated suspects in violation of the sixth amendment right
to counsel should be incorporated into Perkins. The overriding policy would be that coercive
police tactics against an incarcerated suspect create an unacceptable risk of infringement of
the suspect's constitutional rights. See also Dix, supra note 33; Arizona v. Fulminante, Il1 S.
Ct. 1246, 1266 (1991) (impossible to create a meaningful distinction between confessions elicited
in violation of the sixth amendment and those in violation of the fourteenth amendment).
105. 447 U.S. 264 (1980); see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
106. Henry, 447 U.S. at 273.
107. 477 U.S. 436 (1986) ; see supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
108. Id. at 456 n.19.
109. For the text of the conversation between Perkins and Parisi and Charlton, see supra
note 26.
110. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 299 n.4 (1966).
111. In Moran, the suspect, not police, initiated the conversation that led to the damaging
confession. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1986).
112. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 319 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).




protection against possible future abuse resulting from an informant's zeal
in obtaining incriminating, but involuntary, statements from incarcerated
suspects. Unfortunately, the actual rule enunciated in Perkins leaves little
constitutional protection between incarcerated suspects and their captors.
Finally, Perkins may only 'serve to increase tension in our overcrowded
and volatile prison systems.114 Thus, an inmate turned informant could
threaten or bully a fellow inmate into making a confession free of Miranda
constraints in order to gain favor from law enforcement officers."' Perkins
is too broad in the unique context of the prison environment where the
constant threat of physical danger increases the potential for abuse of
constitutional rights." 6
Effective law enforcement should not sacrifice constitutional guarantees.
The rule in Perkins jeopardizes constitutional protections for incarcerated
suspects because of the state's unique position to exploit an inmate's vul-
nerability. In resolving this issue in future cases, the Court should heed the
warning from Justice McKenna that our rights declared in words may
become lost in reality."
7
VI. Conclusion
Perkins establishes an exception to Miranda whenever an undercover agent
converses with an incarcerated suspect. Perkins should have allowed admis-
sion of incriminating statements only when the undercover agent listened
and made no deliberate attempt to question the suspect about the crime.
Unfortunately, Perkins offers little constitutional protection for incarcerated
police and increased protection for suspects. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions,
127 U. PA. L. Rnv. 581, 599 (1979).
114. "[I]t is traditional that informants, called 'rats' or 'snitches,' are to be punished [by
other inmates] with severe beatings or death." L. BOWKER, PRISON VICTMzSaIAoN 27 (1980).
Justice Marshall also noted the "constant threat of physical danger peculiar to the prison
environment ..... " Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2403.
115. Alas, the possibility for abuse may have become a reality. On March 26, 1990, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Arizona v. Fulminante. The case involved an inmate acting
as a government informer who offered to protect defendant from other inmates, who had
been giving defendant "rough treatment," if defendant confessed to killing a child. In exchange
for informant's protection, defendant confessed and was convicted based upon the strength of
the confessions. In State v. Fulminante, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the informer
exerted improper coercion, but error was harmless in admitting confession in view of second
voluntary confession to another person. On reconsideration, the court held that error in
admitting coerced confession is never harmless and reverses conviction. State v. Fulminante,
778 P.2d 602, 627 (Ariz. 1988).
116. "Prison is a barely controlled jungle where the aggressive and the strong will exploit
the weak and the weak are dreadfully aware of it." L. BOWKER, supra note 110, at 19.
117. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Fulminante broke with precedent
and held that the harmless error rule of Chapman v. California is applicable to the admission
of involuntary/coerced confessions. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1254 (1991) (citing
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).
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suspects against possible abuse from conduct directed toward eliciting in-
criminating statements.
Benjamin McCullar
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